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Why is Asia lagging behind other regions in creating regional judicial institutions? What 
lessons from the operation of such institutions elsewhere could be valuable  to Asian 
regional economic integration? I show that Asian states are not unusually averse to refer 
inter-state  disputes  over  trade,  investment,  and  territory  to global  judicial  institutions. 
Moreover, Asian states are not unique in their reluctance to resolve regional inter-state 
disputes through judicial means: Regional judicial institutions elsewhere have also rarely 
been  used  to  resolve  inter-state  disputes.  The  most  valuable  lesson  for  Asia  from 
experiences elsewhere is the role that regional courts can  play in resolving disputes 
between  administrative  agencies  and  private  parties  about  the  implementation  of 
international law. While Asia lacks an extensive set of regional laws and regulations that 
create rights and obligations for private parties, there is a broad body of international law 
that already applies in many Asian countries. National administrative agencies or courts 
may not always be well-equipped to interpret this law. I suggest the creation of a regional 
judicial institution that contributes to the uniform application of this law and that may help 
signal  the  commitment  of  states  to  their  international  obligations.  The  proposed 
institution provides incentives for harmonization without creating new obligations, thus 
recognizing the diversity among Asian states. 
 
Keywords: regional judicial institutions, regional economic integration, Asia 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The absence of regional judicial institutions in Asia is one of the most striking differences 
between its regional economic integration projects and those elsewhere. While Asia has 
no active standing regional court, Europe, Latin America, and Africa each have at least 
four active regional courts that have issued thousands of legally binding judgments.
1 
About  90%  of  these  judgments  have  come  since  1990  (Alter  2009).  This  increased 
usage stems not just from Europe but also from the Americas and even Africa. These 
trends are backed by an emerging consensus on the centrality of legal institutions for 
economic development (e.g. Dixit 2009).  
 
Why is Asia lagging behind other regions in this regard? And, what is Asian regional 
economic integration and cooperation missing by not partaking in this trend? This paper 
first discusses the theoretical reasons why regional judicial institutions could enhance 
economic integration and cooperation. It then turns to the question why Asian regional 
cooperation projects have decided (until now) to forego these theoretical advantages. A 
prevalent  hypothesis  among  scholars  and  policymakers  is  that  Asia  has  opted  for  a 
model of cooperation without legalization because Asian states are inherently averse to 
legalized dispute resolution for cultural or institutional reasons.  So far, however, this 
proposition  has  not  been  systematically  tested.  Using  data  and models from  studies 
published in top peer-reviewed journals, I find no evidence that Asian states are less 
likely than other states to refer trade, investment, or territorial disputes to global judicial 
institutions. This also holds for inter-Asian disputes. 
 
A slightly different argument is that Asian regional cooperation projects have a distinct 
social  logic  that  prescribe  consensual  as  opposed  to  legalized  forms  of  dispute 
resolution between states. This is, however, mostly based on a misconception about the 
nature  of  regional  integration  elsewhere.  While  regional  inter-state  dispute  resolution 
mechanisms  are  ubiquitous,  they  are  rarely  used  by  states  involved  in  a  regional 
integration  project.  Resolving  inter-state  disputes  is  not  and  has  not  been  the  main 
contribution of regional judicial institutions. 
 
Instead, the lessons from regional courts elsewhere suggest that they become active 
engines of integration if two conditions are present.
2 First, and most important, there 
must be legally binding regional rules that create rights and obligations for private parties. 
This allows private parties to sue and be sued on the basis of international law. Second, 
there  must  be  an  institutional  configuration  that  allows  private  parties  access  to  a 
regional court. This can be direct (such as in the case of the European Court of Human 
Rights) or indirect through references by national courts. National courts could decide to 
resolve  disputes  over  the  implementation  of  regional  rules  without  reference  to  a 
regional court. Yet, there are instances where they are obliged to do so or when it is in 
their interest to do so. In such cases, regional courts can contribute to the harmonization 
of laws, rules, and practices, which in turn may stimulate transnational economic activity.  
                                            
1  Alter (2009) finds evidence of almost 30,000 rulings issued by standing international courts until 2007. 
About  90%  of  these  rulings  come  from  regional  courts.  This  number  does  not  include  rulings  by 
arbitration panels or non-permanent courts. 
2  For a similar argument, see Alter (2009).  
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While Asia has few regional treaties that create legal obligations and rights for private 
parties, there is a broad body of international trade and commercial law that is already 
relevant. I suggest that a judicial institution could be created that can, at the request of 
national courts or administrative agencies, offer advisory opinions on the interpretation of 
international  rules,  laws,  and  standards  that  are  already  applicable.  The  underlying 
assumption  is  that  governments  want  to  see  those  obligations  implemented  but  that 
national administrative agencies or courts may not always be well-equipped to do so. 
The new institution would allow Asian states to send a signal that they are committed to 
take  their  legal  obligations  seriously.  Moreover,  it  would  contribute  to  the  uniform 
application  (and  thus  harmonization)  of  commercial  law  while  allowing  each  state  to 
make new obligations at their own pace. The concluding sections offer some thoughts on 
political feasibility, issues of institutional design, and expected effects. 
 
 
2.  How Could Regional Judicial Institutions Promote 
Economic Integration? 
 
In what way could regional judicial institutions contribute to economic integration and 
cooperation?  Regional  economic  cooperation  refers  to  cooperative  policies  such  as 
sharing technology, reducing trade barriers, and otherwise facilitating market access for 
regional  parties.  Regional  economic  integration  also  implies  harmonization  or 
standardization of laws and regulations across countries. Cooperation and integration 
are ultimately aimed at increasing economic transactions. Judicial institutions address 
two  immediate  problems  that  arise  in  any  such  project:  dispute  resolution  and  rule 
interpretation. These activities may have broader effects by improving compliance with, 
commitment  to,  and  implementation  of  regional  agreements.  This  section  briefly 
discusses each in turn. 
 
2.1  Dispute Resolution 
 
An increase in economic transactions also increases the probability that disputes arise 
between governments and/or private parties across borders. The expectation that such 
disputes are resolved in an impartial and efficient way by third parties both increases the 
likelihood that contracts are entered into and the likelihood that transactions continue in 
the aftermath of disputes. The ability to adjudicate disputes is central to courts around 
the world. The minimal institutional design requirements for effective dispute resolution 
are limited. The ideal-typical model requires primarily that the third actor who resolves a 
dispute is impartial and that there are few impediments to utilizing the dispute resolution 
mechanism (Shapiro 1981). 
 
These requirements do not necessarily imply a standing court but could be achieved with 
arbitration. In its most basic version, two parties both agree to submit a dispute to a third 
party and make some promise to accept the third party‘s ruling. In most cases, however, 
states agree ex ante (through a treaty) that certain actors (other states, foreign investors) 
have a right to sue them in a particular forum.  This is a delegation of authority with 
sovereignty costs attached to it. The motivation for states to do so is that by granting the 
right to be sued they expect increased trade and/or investment in the same way that the  
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right to be sued is essential for business to enter into contracts.  In most arbitral models, 
each party appoints one panelist. These two panelists appoint the third one with mutual 
consent.  This  model  is  especially  prevalent  in  the  resolution  of  investment  disputes, 
often done under the auspices of a standard set of procedures, such as those stipulated 
by  the  World  Bank‘s  International  Centre  for  the  Settlement  of  Investment  Disputes 
(ICSID). It is also used in some regional trade disputes, such as NAFTA‘s binational 
review panels. Other treaties create permanent dispute settlement bodies, meaning that 
states have less control over panel composition.  
 
There  is  some  controversy  over  whether  creating  dispute  settlement  bodies  actually 
increases trade (see Rose 2004, Tomz et al 2007) or investment (see Büthe and Milner 
2009), although all of this evidence is from bilateral treaty membership or GATT/WTO 
rather than for regional agreements.  There is strong evidence that domestic courts that 
resolve simple economic disputes in an efficient manner stimulate economic activity (e.g. 
Djankov  et  al  2003).    It  is  unclear,  however,  to  what  extent  international  dispute 
resolution mechanisms fit this paradigm. Indeed, much of the criticism targeted at the 
WTO  dispute  resolution  mechanism  argues  that  developing  countries  lack  the  legal 
capacity to pursue cases effectively and that this deters them from initiating disputes (e.g. 
Busch et al 2009, Davis and Bermeo 2009).  
 
2.2  Interpretation 
 
Attempts to standardize rules, regulations, and laws across countries can only contribute 
to increased economic activity if the agreements that establish such standardization are 
similarly translated into national laws, rules, and practices. Regional courts can play an 
important  role  in  ensuring  a  uniform  interpretation  of  regional  agreements  across 
member states. All courts engage in interpretational activities of some sort. At a minimum, 
courts must make a judgment on how a particular case fits the law. Yet, treaties are 
always incomplete or imprecise. Consequently, courts frequently make determinations 
about  precisely  how  a  treaty  should  be  interpreted.  These  determinations  do  not 
necessarily match the desires of the states that created the treaty. Such interpretations 
can have broad impact, especially if other courts or panels rely on them.  
 
This latter point is worth elaborating on. There is no formal principle of stare decisis in 
international law. Most international tribunals are asked to limit their focus to the dispute 
at hand. For example, article 59 of the ICJ‘s Statute proclaims that ―The decision of the 
Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular 
case‖  (ICJ  Statute,  Article  59).  Yet,  the  ICJ  motivates  its  resolution  of  disputes  with 
extensive  references  to  its  past  opinions  and  considers  these  as  precedent 
(Shahabuddeen 2007). De facto norms of stare decisis are operative at the WTO (e.g. 
Busch 2007). Similarly, the ECJ and the ECtHR rely heavily on their past decisions, have 
no trepidations in referring to these decisions as ―precedent‖ (e.g. Wildhaber 2000) and 




                                            
3  For  example,  the  ECtHR‘s  case  law  on-line  system  Hudoc  documents  the  ―Strasbourg  law‖  each 
decision relies on. Similarly, EUR-Lex documents the case-law for the ECJ.  
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That norms resembling stare decisis have developed on international courts should not 
be surprising and partially follows from their dispute settlement roles. Courts need to tell 
the losing parties why they lost. In all modern societies, judges tell the loser: "You did not 
lose  because  we  the  judges  chose  that  you  should  lose.  You  lost  because  the  law 
required that you should lose" (Shapiro 1994).  Such justification is essential to establish 
the perception that a tribunal is impartial. Demonstrating the consistency of a decision 
with past decisions may alleviate the losing party‘s potential to claim that a decision was 
whimsical  or motivated by  non-legal  considerations (e.g.  Shapiro  1981,  Stone  Sweet 
2002). Concerns about justification are perhaps even stronger on international courts, 




Although all international judicial institutions engage in treaty interpretation of some sort, 
there is large variation in how far-reaching their authority is in this regard. Some arbitral 
decisions  are  not  public  and  thus  cannot  contribute  to  uniform  interpretation.  Other 
regional courts are merely allowed to give non-binding advisory opinions to states and at 
the request of states. Such opinions could have a broad effect only if they are accepted 
by states. Yet other institutions have constitutional review authority; including the ability 
to nullify domestic laws that are in violation of a regional agreement.
5 Some courts also 
have  administrative  review  roles,  evaluating  complaints  by  private  actors  that 
government  agencies  have  failed  to  properly  implement  a  regional  treaty.
6 For  such 
courts  to  function  properly,  they  must  have  compulsory  jurisdiction  and  allow  private 
access, either through a system of preliminary references by national courts or directly.  
 
The key quality that a court should have to exercise its interpretive function is expertise. 
Indeed, there is some evidence that administrative agencies and national courts refer 
decisions to regional courts because the national courts lack expertise in a certain area, 
such as intellectual property rights law (Helfer and Alter 2009). In addition judges should 
have incentives to issue rulings according to their expertise as opposed to concerns 
about  the  future  of  their  careers  or  the  desires  of  the  governments  who  may  have 
appointed them (Voeten 2008, 2009). This requires some independence on the part of 
judges, at least to the degree that judges should believe that states will not interfere in a 
particular  case  or  will  punish  them  for  interpreting  a  treaty  in  a  manner  that  is 
inconsistent with the wishes of a government. 
 
                                            
4  At least in comparison to domestic courts in developed democracies. There are, of course, numerous 
domestic courts who operate in a weaker compliance environment than, say, the ECJ. There may also 
be reasons that norms to adhere to past precedent are not quite as strong in international courts. For 
example, the ECtHR has developed a ―margin of appreciation‖ doctrine, which posits that countries 
should  have  some  leeway  in  how  they  implement  their  Convention  obligations  into  their  specific 
domestic contexts (e.g. Yourow 1996). This leaves judges some room to motivate deviations from 
case-law with reference to specific national circumstances. 
5  Nullification is not always a direct consequence of a regional court‘s actions. For example, the ECtHR 
can find that a domestic law is in violation of the ECHR but this does not automatically imply that the 
domestic law is nullified. It does, however, imply that future litigants can expect the same outcome of 
challenges to the domestic law, giving governments incentives to change the law. 
6  See Alter 2009 on the distinction between constitutional and administrative review roles.  
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2.3  Compliance 
 
Theories of international cooperation stipulate that fear of non-compliance is one of the 
main  issues  that  stifles  potentially  beneficial  cooperation  between  states.  This  is 
especially so in Prisoner-dilemma type situations, where governments do not engage in 
mutually  beneficial  cooperation  because they  fear  that  they  will  be  the  ones  to take 
costly  measures  to  implement  regional  agreements,  leaving  others  to  benefit.  The 
presence of a regional judicial institution could help in this regard even at the negotiation 
stage.  If  states  expect  enforcement,  they  may  be  more  careful  to  construct  regional 
agreements  that  they  expect  to  comply  with  (e.g.  Fearon  1998).  This  may  not 
necessarily increase the volume of regional agreements but should increase their quality. 
 
All courts aim to increase compliance to some degree, hoping that the shadow of binding 
judicial enforcement makes it more likely that states comply with agreed upon rules. Yet, 
the prospect of a costly law suit by another state may not be sufficient incentive for 
compliance. Legalized dispute resolution between states is an indirect way to resolve 
trade disputes. The parties that directly benefit from or are hurt by unfair trade practices 
are generally firms. Firms lobby their governments in order to convince them that it is 
also  in  their  interest  to  incur  the  economic  and  political  cost  of  launching  a  dispute 
against another government. These political costs may be especially high in the context 
of a regional integration project. It may not seem credible that a global institution such as 
the  WTO  has  a  bias  for  or  against  (for  example)  Malaysia  or  Indonesia.  Yet,  such 
charges are more likely in a context where there are few actors with well-understood 
histories  and  cleavages.  Regional  institutions  generally  serve  other  purposes  than 
resolving disputes. Potential charges of bias in the resolution of contentious disputes 
may have negative spillover effects to the workings of these institutions. Indeed, the data 
will show that regional courts embedded in larger integration projects are rarely used to 
resolve inter-state disputes.  
 
Some regional agreements address compliance more directly, by creating a treaty body 
that monitors compliance by member states and can file infringement or non-compliance 
cases  with  a  regional  court.  Examples  are  the  European  commission,  but  also  the 
Andean Community and other regional organizations have such treaty bodies (see Alter 
2009, Ch. 2 for an overview). Others allow private actors direct access, either directly 
(the European Court of Human Rights) or indirectly by allowing national courts to refer 
cases to a regional court. Such arrangements substantially reduce the cost of litigation in 
comparison to pure inter-state disputes and thus should increase the expectation that a 
regional agreement will be enforced.  Yet, there are also larger sovereignty costs to such 
institutional arrangements. 
 
2.4  Implementation and Administrative Authority 
 
Non-compliance is not necessarily the result of willful acts by governments to act in ways 
that are inconsistent with treaty commitments. Many issues of non-compliance arise due 
to the complexity of implementing agreements (see Chayes and Chayes 1993, Raustiala 
and Slaughter 2002). Implementing regional agreements generally requires delegating 
tasks to a bureaucracy or even an independent regulatory agency. Bureaucracies vary in 
their technical capacities to implement regional regulation. Moreover, agencies generally  
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have some discretion and could potentially abuse this to implement their own policy 
preferences or extract rents.  
 
Allowing  private  parties  to  challenge  administrative  decisions  in  front  of  impartial 
tribunals  could  limit  such  practices  and  strengthen  the  capacity  of  administrative 
agencies  to  correctly  implement  regional  rules.  Such  fire  alarm  control  could  be 
exercised  by  domestic  administrative  tribunals.  Regional  tribunals  have  the  added 
benefit  of contributing  to  coordination  of  interpretation. This  is  important  as  common 
regulation only has the desired effect if it is interpreted in a common way. Moreover, 
regional  courts  may  have  better  expertise  to  interpret  international  law.  In  several 
regional  agreements,  most  notably  the  EU,  OHADA,  and  the  Andean  Community, 
national courts then have the right or obligation to refer disputes over regional law to a 
regional  court.  As  the  empirical  part  of  this  paper  will  demonstrate,  many  of  these 
disputes are between private parties and regulatory agencies over the proper application 
of regional law in the denial of permits, trademarks, and so on. These regional courts 
often  issue  advisory  rulings  only  about  the  interpretation  of  regional  law  in  a  case, 
leaving  the  actual  resolution  of  a  dispute  to  the  national  court.  This  limits  their 
interference with domestic sovereignty. 
 
There are two other ways in which regional courts contribute to checking administrative 
authority.  First,  some  regional  integration  projects,  most  notably  the  EU,  create  new 
supranational bureaucracies with the authority to implement, interpret, and even issue 
legally  binding  rules  and  rulings.  The  ECJ  often  reviews  disputes  between  the 
Commission and states or private parties about the proper exercise of that authority. 
Second, the ECtHR has determined on various occasions that existing procedures for 
administrative review in countries such as the Netherlands and Sweden were not truly 
independent,  for  example  because  the  review  determinations  were  also  done  by 
administrators rather than judges. Such rulings have led to important institutional reforms. 
 
There is a large literature in economics that illustrates the positive economic effects of a 
proper system of checks and balances to the exercise of administrative authority (e.g. 
Persson  and Tabellini  2003).  Recent  research  in  economic  history  suggests that  the 
need to check administrative power was the key to the development of the rule of law in 
modern  Europe  (González  de  Lara  et  al,  2008,  Greif  2008).  Such  checking  of 
administrative  authority  aids  in  the  harmonization  of  law  across  countries,  prevents 
abuses  of  authority,  and  helps  make  administrative  decisions  more  predictable  for 
businesses.  All  of  these  activities  theoretically  stimulate  economic  activity.  Moreover, 
they interfere less directly with sovereignty than the remedies targeted at willful non-
compliance by states. 
 
 
2.5  Credibility of Commitments 
 
Regional cooperation may be stifled by uncertainties about the degree to which actors 
are  committed  to  the  project.  Regional  agreements  suffer  from  a  time  inconsistency 
problem: even if it is in the interest of a government to comply with an agreement, the 
incentives for that government may change or the government may lose power. Since 
regional cooperation and especially integration often require costly ex ante investments  
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with promises of long-term benefits, uncertainty about the commitment of actors could 
stifle a cooperation project.  
 
Delegating  authority  to  an  independent  court  increases  the  credibility  of  these 
commitments.  For  example,  new  democracies  may  want  to  signal  that  they  are 
committed  to  upholding  human  rights  by  signing  a  human  rights  treaty.  They  could 
increase the credibility of that commitment by also delegating authority to interpret a 
treaty  to  a  regional  court  and  allowing  citizens  to  directly  file  suit  with  that  court 
(Moravcsik  2000).  This  may  increase  the  perception  of  other  actors  that  these 
governments are committed to a regional integration effort and perhaps make actors 
more likely to make long-term investments (Farber 2002). Governments also frequently 
use judgments by international courts to explain to their domestic publics why they have 
to  maintain  an  unpopular  (protectionist)  policy  (Reinhardt  2002),  thus  potentially 
alleviating  fears  that  cooperation  will  stop  due  to  domestic  opposition.  Moreover, 
delegation to regional courts may alleviate concerns among smaller states that they will 
be subjected to power-based inequalities in the implementation of regional agreements. 
Such assurances could be central to deepen cooperation among states.  
 
The credibility of a commitment to regional integration is only increased if the delegation 
to  the  regional  court  is  meaningful  in  the  sense  that  court  is  independent,  has 
compulsory jurisdiction, is easily accessible for potential disputants, imposes meaningful 
penalties on non-compliance, and is costly to withdraw from. Indeed, the very logic of 
this argument stipulates that there are benefits to incurring sovereignty costs.   
 
 
3.  Are Asian States Less Likely To Resolve Disputes Through 
Legal Means? 
 
Why have Asian countries, in contrast to governments elsewhere, seemingly rejected the 
potential benefits of regional courts discussed in the previous section? The answer to 
this question is important for understanding the lessons that can plausibly be learned 
from experience elsewhere. Many accounts of why Asian countries prefer cooperation 
without legalization are based on the notion that Asian states share a strong preference 
for non-binding commitments and non-legalistic methods of dispute resolution. This is 
generally considered a central feature of the "ASEAN way" as well as the "Asia-Pacific 
way" of cooperation (e.g. Acharya 1997). To some scholars this stems from a distinct 
legal culture that is less adversarial and litigious than Western legal culture (e.g. Green 
1994). Instead, Asian approaches to dispute resolution stress consensus and informality. 
Scholars have identified such differences in legal culture as one of the main challenges 
for Asian states to participate in global legal regimes, such as the WTO (Peng 2000).  
Some claim that the rise of Asian economies will significantly challenge the emerging 
global legal culture based on US legal practices and replace it with a culture based on 
informal dispute resolution (Appelbaum 1997). Others argue that Asian countries differ 
not  so  much  because  they  lack  an  adversarial  legal  culture  but  because  of  their 
domestic political institutions and the sensitive nature of diplomatic relations between  
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Asian states.
7 Again others maintain that Asian governments‘ unusually strong concerns 
about sovereignty costs lie at the root of their unwillingness to use legalized forms of 
dispute settlement (Poon 2001). 
 
There is considerable criticism of the notion that there are cultural or institutional reasons 
that underpin the cooperation without legalization route that Asian regionalism has taken. 
For example, scholars have pointed to the diversity in Asia‘s domestic political and legal 
institutions  (Kahler  2000,  Pryles  2006).  Yet,  as  far  as  I  am  aware,  there  are  no 
systematic tests in the literature of the proposition that Asian states are less likely than 
others to resolve their disputes through legal means. Such a test is important for the 
purposes of this paper. If Asian countries have unusually strong predispositions against 
using legal means to resolve disputes, then the lessons from other regions may not be 
applicable to the Asian context.  
 
My  empirical  strategy  for  evaluating  this  question  is  to  replicate  recently  published 
analyses of legalized dispute resolutions in three critical areas: trade, investment, and 




3.1  Trade Disputes 
 
If Asian countries are averse to legalized dispute settlement, they may be less likely to 
initiate trade disputes at the GATT/WTO than are other countries. In a study published in 
the  Journal  of  Politics,  Davis  and  Bermeo  (2009)  analyze  why  some  developing 
countries are more likely than others to initiate disputes at the GATT/WTO. They argue 
that there are large start-up costs for using the dispute settlement process. Therefore, 
they hypothesize that past experience as a complainant or defendant makes states more 
likely to initiate disputes in the future. 
 
I replicated their analysis (without problems) and added an indicator variable for whether 
a  country  is  Asian.  The  sample  includes  75  developing  countries  that  were  WTO 
members  by  2003  (the  end  of  the  data),  including  14  Asian  countries.  The  analysis 
excludes  31  least  developed  countries  who  are  beneficiaries  to  preferential  market 
access and have less need to invoke WTO rights. Davis and Bermeo argue that the 
correlates that determine dispute initiation among developed countries are different and 
estimate a separate model for this group. The dependent variable is the number of cases 
a country initiated in a given year. The model is estimated using a negative binomial 
regression, with robust standard errors clustered on countries. 
 
Table 1 offers the results of the simplest specifications estimated by Davis and Bermeo. 
The indicator for Asia does not have an effect on either developing or developed country 
dispute initiation. This result also holds in the more extensive models with additional 
control variables and a model where the dependent variable is converted to a binary 
                                            
7  For example, Davis and Shirato (2007) use such an account to explain Japan‘s restraint in initiating 
WTO  trade  disputes.  This  also  fits  with  the  large  literature  that  sees  democracy  as  the  key  to 
explaining trends in legalization (add citations). 
8  http://www.adb.org/Countries/ (accessed 30 June 2009). Japan is also included.  
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indicator, allowing for the use of a logit estimation. Finally, the result holds for developing 
countries if the democracy variable is omitted from the regression model, indicating that 
it is not the scarcity of democracies in Asia that drives this result. 
 
In all, there is no evidence that Asian countries are more averse to seeking legalized 
resolutions of their trade disputes. Of the 352 disputes initiated between the start of the 
WTO process in 1995 and October 2006, there have been nine within-Asia disputes 
between Singapore and Malaysia, Republic of Korea (Korea) and Japan (2), Japan and 
Indonesia (2), Korea and the Philippines, Bangladesh and India, Indonesia and Korea, 
and Taipei,China and India.
9 This is more than the number of disputes filed among Latin 
American, European, African, or Central American states. There are obviously different 
base-line  probabilities  for  the  filing  of  such  within  region  disputes,  yet  it  is  hard  to 
maintain based on these data that Asian states have a deep cultural aversion against 
legalized resolutions of their trade disputes. 
 
3.2  Investment Disputes 
 
The  regulation  of  foreign  investment  has  long  been  a  potent  source  for  disputes, 
especially  when  foreign  property  is  expropriated  by  host  governments  of  foreign 
investments. In recent years, the regulation of foreign investment has increasingly taken 
the form of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), which may or may not delegate authority 
to an international authority to resolve disputes between foreign firms and governments 
(e.g.  Franck  2007).  The  most  prominent  international  body  that  resolves  the  vast 
majority  of  investment  disputes  is  the  World  Bank‘s  International  Centre  for  the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). ICSID rulings are public, are closely watched 
by investors, and are consequential for future FDI streams (Allee and Peinhardt 2009b). 
Governments have much less control over ICSID dispute resolution mechanisms than if 
they delegated dispute resolution to ad hoc arbitral tribunals or domestic courts (e.g. 
Franck 2007).  
 
If Asian  countries  indeed  prefer cooperation  without  legalized  dispute  settlement,  we 
would expect these countries to be less willing to delegate authority to ICSID when they 
agree on cooperation by signing a BIT. Allee and Peinhardt (2009a) coded all publicly 
archived  BITs for  their  level  of  delegation  to  ICSID. They  create  an  ordinal  variable, 
coded 0 in the absence of any delegation, 1 if ICSID is one of the options for dispute 
resolutions and 2 if ICSID is the only venue for international arbitration. They argue that 
this variable reflects the degree of delegation in an ordinal way because governments 
usually have some control over the venue of arbitration if ICSID is only one of more 
options. The negotiation of BITs tends to be asymmetric in that there is usually one 
‗home‘  country  (from  which  most  of  the  investment  originates)  and  a  ‗host‘  country 
(towards  which  the  investment  is  directed).  Home  countries  typically  (although  not 
always) tend to prefer ICSID delegation but the preferences of host countries vary.  
 
 
                                            
9  Based  on  the  World  Bank‘s  WTO  data:  http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/ 
EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20804376~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.ht
ml (accessed 13 July 2009).  
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Allee  and  Peinhardt  identify  a  range  of  characteristics  of  host  countries  and  home 
countries as well as of the relationship between them that would make it more or less 
likely that a BIT includes an ICSID provision. I refer the interested reader to their article 
for more details on the theoretical motivation for including these variables. The appendix 
lists the variables and precise data sources. I replicated their original results (without 
problems) and added to their model indicator variables for whether there is an Asian 
home or host country and an additional indicator variable for whether both countries are 
Asian.  
 
Table 2 has the results from an ordinal probit model. Quite strikingly, an Asian home 
country makes it significantly more likely that a BIT delegates authority to ICSID. The 
same is true for an Asian host country, although this effect is only significant at the 10% 
level in a two-tailed test. There is no additional effect of both countries being Asian. It is 
clear  that Asian  countries  are  not  more  likely  to  cooperate  without  legalized  dispute 
resolution. If anything, the result seems to go the other way. 
 
It is perhaps plausible that this reflects the specific Asian countries who sign BITs or that 
Asian  countries  are  less  likely  to  sign  BITs  because  they  expect  that  a  legalized 
commitment  will  be  involved.  There  is,  as  far  as  I  can  tell,  no  evidence  in  the  BIT 
literature of such a proposition. Moreover, coverage is broad. The data includes BITs 
with 16 different Asian home governments and 29 different Asian host governments. 112 
(11%)  of  the  BITs  have  home  countries  that  are  Asian  and  251  (25%)  have  host 
countries that are Asian. This includes 65 BITs involving People‘s Republic of China, 
which only include exclusive ICSID clauses in 9% of its BITs and had no ICSID option in 
59% of its treaties. In all, though, exclusive delegation to ICSID exists in 45% of BITs 
with  an Asian  home  country,  36%  of  BITs  with  an Asian  host  country,  42%  of  BITs 
between  two  Asian  states  but  only  29%  of  the  total  population  of  BITs.  Moreover, 
countries  that  are  threatening  to  leave  the  ICSID  system  appear  to  be  from  Latin 
America,  not  Asia  (Franck  2009,  p.  436-7).These  data  simply  do  not  support  a 
conclusion that Asian countries that have signed BITs are particularly averse to legalized 
dispute settlement (i.e. they do not prefer cooperation without legalization).
10 
 
3.3  Territorial Disputes 
 
Territory is another commodity over which states frequently bargain and even fight. Yet, 
territorial  disputes  can  also  be  settled  through  legal  dispute  resolution,  for  example 
through the International Court of Justice (ICJ) the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). 
A characteristic of such legal solutions is that both countries need to agree to it. If Asian 
countries  are  averse  to  legalized  solutions,  then  territorial  disputes  involving  Asian 
countries should be less likely to be resolved by legal means than are other disputes. 
 
In a study published in the American Political Science Review, Allee and Huth (2006) 
investigate what makes states more and less likely to choose legal dispute resolution 
over bilateral negotiations as a means for settling territorial disputes. They identify 1490 
bilateral rounds of negotiations in 348 disputes over territory. They then code whether 
                                            
10  Note that since companies rather than states tend to file ICSID suits, it is more useful to analyze the 
initial decision to allow this to take place rather than the actual usage of ICSID.  
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the negotiation round ended in a stalemate, compromise (bilateral concessions) or a 
legalized form of dispute resolution. Their core theoretical contribution is the argument 
that international legal rulings at least in some significant part provide political cover for 
leaders in need of making concessions. 
 
I  refer  the  interested  reader  to  the  Allee  and  Huth  article  for  more  detail  on  model 
specification.  The  appendix  provides  more  detail  on  measurement.  I  successfully 
replicated their analyses (Table 2 in the article) and added two indicator variables: one 
for  whether  the  dispute  involved  an  Asian  country  (true  for  350  (23%)  of  rounds  of 
negotiations in the data) and one for whether both parties in the dispute were Asian (true 
for 199 (13%) of cases).  The second variable is included to assess whether there is an 
additional effect if both parties are Asian and thus, presumably, unlikely to resort to legal 
solutions for their territorial disputes.  
 
Table 3 shows that there is no significant effect of Asian involvement on the likelihood 
that a dispute has a legal resolution. Thus, the involvement of Asian countries makes it 
neither  more  or  less  likely  that  a  dispute  is  resolved  through  legal  means.  Creating 
exclusive category where one indicator variable measures whether only one Asian state 
is  involved  does  not  materially  affect  the  result  nor  does  dropping  the  indicator  for 
whether the conflict involves two Asian states. 
 
The Allee and Huth data only runs until 1995. Since then, there have been at least two 
other Asian territorial disputes that were submitted to the ICJ: the dispute over Pedra 
Branca/Pulau  Batu  Puteh,  Middle  Rocks  and  South  Ledge  between  Malaysia  and 
Singapore and the dispute over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan between Indonesia 
and Malaysia. In all, there is no evidence that Asian countries are more reluctant than 
others to seek legalized dispute settlement for their territorial conflicts. 
 
 
4.  Regional Resolution of Inter-State Disputes 
 
The preceding section demonstrates that Asian states are not less likely to resolve inter-
state disputes through legal means in global institutions. Another plausible story is that 
Asian regional integration projects have a distinct social logic that warrants cooperation 
without legalization and that explicitly rejects European-style institutionalization. This is 
especially  reflected  in  the  "ASEAN  way"  of  regional  cooperation.  As  Acharya  (1997, 
p.329) puts it:  
 
[..]  the  "ASEAN  way"  is  not  so  much  about  the  substance  or  structure  of 
multilateral  interactions,  but  a  claim  about  the  process  through  which  such 
interactions are carried out. This approach involves a high degree of discreetness, 
informality, pragmatism, expediency, consensus-building, and non-confrontational 
bargaining styles which are often contrasted with the adversarial posturing and 
legalistic decision-making procedures in Western multilateral negotiations. 
 
The  "ASEAN  way"  influenced  Asia-Pacific  regional  cooperation  and  has  also  been 
termed  the  "Asian  way"  of  regional  cooperation  (Acharya  1997).  Indeed,  there  is  no 
documented use of legalized regional mechanisms to settle disputes between states in  
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Asia.  This  section  evaluates  whether  this  aversion  to  the  use  of  regional  legalized 
resolution of inter-state disputes is unusual. Inter-state disputes are those where one 
state files dispute against each other and each state gets to present its case before a 
tribunal. As the summary below will show, while virtually all regional judicial institutions 
allow for such inter-state disputes (as does the ASEAN dispute settlement mechanism), 
these provisions are rarely used.  
 
4.1  Inter-State Disputes in Regional Tribunals 
 
There are four standing international courts
11 in Europe. The best known ones are the 
highest courts of the European Union: the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the 
Court of First Instance (CFI). Under Article 227, EU member states could directly bring 
complaints to the ECJ against other member states. The article has been used only a 
handful of times and was described as ―a virtual dead letter‖ in a recent overview of ECJ 
activity (Brunell et al 2008). The Court of Justice of the European Free Trade Agreement 
(EFTA) resolves disputes involving countries that are not part of the EU but that are part 
of the European Free Trade Area.
12 The agreement that establishes the EFTA  Court 
grants the Court jurisdiction to settle disputes between two or more member states.
13 Yet, 
none  of  its  102  pending  or  decided  cases  are  inter-state  disputes.
14 The  BENELUX 
Court  of  Justice  interprets  rules  of  law  common  to  Belgium,  the  Netherlands,  and 
Luxemburg. The BENELUX treaty established a College of Arbitrators to settle disputes 
between states but it has not appointed new arbitrators since the first nomination in 1962 
and has never been used.
15 Finally, the Council of Europe‘s European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) has issued over 10,000 judgments on individual complaints but only 3 
inter-state cases.
16 As of 2009, these courts have together allowed inter-state cases for 
172 years. Yet, it is difficult to find even 10 examples of such cases. In short, European 
states have not settled their inter-state disputes by suing each other in regional courts.  
 
In addition, the Economic Court of the Commonwealth of Independent States (ECCIS) 
was created in 1991 to resolve trade disputes among the countries belonging to the 
Commonwealth  of  Independent  States  (CIS)  (Danilenko  1999).
17  Unlike  the  other 
European courts, the legal status of ECCIS decisions is in dispute and the court has 
                                            
11  Information  comes  from  the  Project  on  International  Courts  and  Tribunals:  http://www.pict-pcti.org 
(accessed 7 July 2009). 
12  Currently, these countries are Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. 
13  Article 32, see http://www.eftacourt.int/index.php/court/mission/esa_court_agreement/ (accessed 6 July 
2009). 
14  http://www.eftacourt.int/index.php/cases (accessed 6 July 2009). 
15  http://www.pict-pcti.org/courts/beneluxCJ.html (accessed 7 July 2009). 
16  There were 17 inter-state complaints that were dealt with by the European Commission on Human 
Rights.  Georgia  has  recently  brought  another  inter-state  complaint  (against  Russia):  ―Inter-State 
Application Brought by Georgi Against the Russian Federation.‖ Press release by the Registrar of the 
European  Court  of  Human  Rights,  27  March  2007.  http://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1111315  
&Site=COE (accessed 9 July 2009). 
17  It only became a formal judicial organ of CIS in 1993 (Danilenko 1999).  
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weak enforcement capabilities, thus allowing losing states to ignore its rulings (Danilenko 
1999, Dragneva and De Kort 2007). During its first decade, the court issued 65 decisions, 
54 of which were advisory opinions and only 9 were disputes about non-performance of 
economic obligations (Dragneva and De Kort 2007, p. 260). While little information is 
available about these 9 cases, the perception is that they have been resolved through 
negotiation (Dragneva and De Kort 2007, fn. 112). 
 
The  evidence  from  Latin  America  is  similar.  The  Court  of  Justice  of  the  Andean 
Community (ATJ) is the third most active international court with 1492 rulings (Helfer and 
Alter  2009,  Helfer  et  al  2009).  About  90%  of  these  cases  came  from  preliminary 
references by national courts. Almost all of the other cases were initiated by a treaty 
organ  (the  Secretary-General).  I  have  been  able  to  find  only  three  pure  inter-state 
cases.
18 Mercosur has had a formal arbitration system in place since 1991, which only 
allowed  access  to  state  parties.  As  of  2005,  arbitration  panels  had  issued  only  nine 
awards (Vervaele 2005). Institutional reforms to create more advanced forms of dispute 
resolution are under way.  
 
The  Central  American Court  of Justice  (CACJ)  was  originally  established  in  1907 to 
maintain peace and resolve disagreements between Central American States. It was 
dissolved in 1918. Three of the court‘s ten decisions were inter-state cases.
19 Since its 
restart in 1990, the court has issued an additional 78 rulings (Alter 2009) but it is unclear 
how  many  are  inter-state  disputes.  The  Caribbean  Court  of  Justice  (CCJ)  was 
established  in  2001
20 by  the  members  of  the  Caribbean  Community  (CARICOM)  to 
replace  the  Judicial  Committee  of  the  Privy  Council  and  to  interpret  the  Treaty 
Establishing the Caribbean Community. The court has issued 34 judgments, none of 
which were inter-state disputes.
21 
 
NAFTA  does  not  have  a  standing  court  but  does  allow  for  ad  hoc  binational  review 
panels, most notable those under chapter 19. This has led to concerns about strategic 
forum shopping with the WTO (Busch 2007) and to critiques that the NAFTA panels 
supersede  conventional  judicial  review.
22 The  chapter  19  procedure  allows  private 
parties  to  sue  administrative  agencies  for  their  decisions  on  antidumping  or 
countervailing duties. On at least 23 cases, government lawyers argued on behalf of 
these private parties, creating a perception of putting two state actors into conflict with 
                                            
18  Article  24  of  the  Treaty  Creating  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  Cartagena  Agreement 
(http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/normativa/ande_trie2.htm)  allows  states  to  file  non-
compliance claims with the secretary-general. The ATJ web-site suggests that it has happened on only 
three  occasions  that  a  state  was  the  originator  of  a  non-compliance  complaint 
(http://idatd.eclac.cl/controversias/can.htm?perform=estadisticas&numero=5).  Yet,  when  reading 
cases it becomes clear that several of the cases brought by the secretary-general originated with state 
complaints (private communication with Karen Alter and Larry Helfer, 7 July 2009). 
19  http://www.worldcourts.com/cacj/eng/decisions.htm (accessed 10 July 2009). 
20  The court was inaugurated in 2005. 
21  http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/judgments.html (accessed 10 July 2009). 
22  Adam Liptak ―Nafta Tribunals Stir U.S. Worries‖ The New York Times Sunday 18 April 2004.  
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each other.
23 NAFTA does not have a treaty organ in charge of enforcement nor is it part 
of a deeper regional integration project.  
 
Africa has four active international courts: Common Court Of Justice And Arbitration Of 
The Organization For The Harmonization Of Corporate Law In Africa (OHADA, or OHBLA), 
the Court Of Justice Of The Common Market For Eastern And Southern Africa (COMESA), 
Court of Justice of the East African Community (EACJ), and the Court of Justice of the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). OHADA aims to harmonize 
corporate law in 16 mostly francophone African states. Its Common Court of Justice and 
Arbitration  had  issued  274  judgments  by  2007  (Alter  2009),  none  were  inter-state 
cases.
24 COMESA  established  a  common  market  between  19  states  in  Eastern  and 
Southern Africa. Its court was established in 1994 and its first judges were appointed by 
1998.
25 The Court had heard seven cases by 2007 (Alter 2009), none of which appear to 
be inter-state cases.
26 The EACJ and its predecessor have issued eight rulings, none of 
which appear to have been inter-state cases.
27 The ECOWAS court has received 33 
cases, none inter-state disputes.
28 
 
There are also a number of courts that have been in existence for some time but that 
have never or rarely been used (Alter 2009). These include the Organization of Arab 
Petroleum Exporting Countries Tribunal (OAPEC) (1978), The West African Economic 
and Monetary Union Court (WAEMU) (1995) , the Community of Central Africa Court of 
Justice  (CEMAC)  (2000),  and  the  Tribunal  of  the  Southern  African  Development 
Community (SADC) (2007).
29 Thus, the ASEAN dispute resolution mechanisms is not 
the only existing DSM that has not been used.  
 
4.2  Why So Little Use of Regional Mechanisms for Inter-State Disputes? 
 
In all, the number of standing regional courts is about equal to the total number of direct 
inter-state disputes that they have resolved. Why are there so few inter-state disputes 
submitted to regional courts? Part of the answer is that some regional agreements have 
treaty bodies, such as the European Commission, that can file infringement suits against 
                                            
23  Based on a reading of disputes at: http://www.sice.oas.org/DISPUTE/nafdispe.asp (accessed 7 July 
2009). In addition there were 25 disputes filed by private business where I did not find evidence of 
government  involvement  on  both  sides.  Chapter  11  also  gives  private  actors  standing  to  sue 
governments for damages, a procedure that has been widely used. There has also been one inter-
state dispute under Chapter 20. 
24  http://www.ohada.com/jurisprudence.php (accessed 13 July 2009). 
25  http://about.comesa.int/lang-en/institutions/court-of-justice (accessed 13 July 2009). 
26  I  was  able  to  find  evidence  of  only  five  cases:  http://www.aictctia.org/courts_subreg/comesa/                                        
comesa_cases.html (accessed 13 July 2009). 
27  Alter 2009 and http://www.aict-ctia.org/courts_subreg/eac/eac_home.html (accessed 13 July 2009). 
28  http://www.aict-ctia.org/courts_subreg/ecowas/ecowas_home.html (accessed 13 July 2009). 
29  Moreover, there are a number of courts that are not yet operational, including the Court of Justice for 
the Arab Magreb Union (AMU), the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of Central African 
States (ECCAS), and the African Court of Justice (ACJ).  
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states and that can, to some extent, serve as substitutes for inter-state disputes. It is 
likely that some complaints about foreign practices originate with other governments, 
although there is no hard evidence that documents this. Politically, there is a difference 
between cases between a commission and a government and cases where two states 
involved in a broader regional integration project directly challenge each other in court. 
Among  others,  it  would force the  court  to chose  sides  between  two  member  states, 
which could cause some fallout for a regional integration project. Moreover, especially 
the literature on the EU shows that the Commission often takes its own initiatives and is 
quite far from a simple tool that (powerful) member states can use to go after each other 
(e.g. Pollack 1997). Finally, DSMs in regions that lack a supranational body are also not 
frequently  used,  suggesting  that  there  is  something  else  going  on  than  a  simple 
substitute story. 
 
The  theory  section  already  highlighted  that  economic  disputes  between  states  are 
usually proxy disputes.  Businesses are harmed or benefit from unfair trade practices. 
States are only hurt indirectly. There are many hurdles that may prevent states from filing 
suits  against  each  other.  Businesses  must  lobby  governments  to  file  suits  on  their 
behalves  and  pay  the  cost  for  this.  This  generally  only  works  if  they  come  from  a 
particularly influential or economically important sector. In such cases, it may be more 
useful  to  file  at  a  global  institution,  such  as  the  WTO,  where  the  precedent  will  be 
broader.  There  are  many  other  ways  to  resolve  disputes  between  states  and  many 
issues that could be linked together in omnibus compromises. The patterns in the data 
also  suggest  that  there  are  additional  political  cost  to  be  paid  from  using  regional 
institutions for inter-state disputes. For example, the only regional tribunal that is used 
somewhat frequently to resolve (proxy) inter-state  disputes are the NAFTA binational 
review  panels,  which  exist  in  the  absence  of  a  broader  political  regional  integration 
project. At times, the existence of a regional inter-state DSM may be a useful option, if 
only as a potential outcome that all want to avoid. But there is little reason to believe that 
resolving  inter-state  disputes  has  been  a  major  contribution  of  regional  judicial 
institutions or that it will be in the Asian context. 
 
 
5.  What Can Be Learned from the Activity of Regional Judicial 
Institutions? 
 
The widespread perception that Asian states are unusual in their reluctance to resolve 
their disputes through legal means is at least partially based on misconceptions about 
the behavior of Asian states and about the logic of regional integration elsewhere. Asian 
states are not generally less likely than are other states to resolve their disputes through 
legal means. Moreover, regional integration in other parts of the world has not been 
driven  by  legal  institutions  that  resolve  inter-state  disputes.  Indeed,  European,  Latin 
American, and African states also do not sue each other in regional courts and prefer to 
resolve their differences through other means.  
 
These findings  are  important  because  they  establish  that there  is  some  potential for 
learning from the  experience  of regional  judicial  institutions  elsewhere.  But  what  are 
these potential lessons that could be valuable for Asian regional cooperation projects? I  
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review the evidence by answering the questions suggested in the theory section. What 
disputes do they resolve? What is their interpretive authority? How does the exercise of 
their dispute resolution and interpretive activities influence compliance, commitment, and 
checks and balances?  I then apply these lessons to the design of a potential new Asian 
judicial institution. 
 
5.1  The Activities of Courts: Dispute Resolution and Interpretation 
 
Most disputes in front of regional judicial institutions are of two kinds. First, there are 
disputes between a treaty body, such as the European Commission, and a government, 
for example about whether a government has correctly implemented a treaty provision. 
Such cases constitute about one-fourth of the ECJ‘s caseload and less than 10% of the 
ATJ  caseload  (Alter  2009).  Second,  and  much  more  commonly,  regional  judicial 
institutions review disputes between private actors and a government or a government 
agency. These may  be cases  where  a  private  party  charges  that  a government  has 
incorrectly  implemented  regional  law.  More  commonly,  these  are  cases  where  the 
relevant law for a dispute over an administrative decision is regional rather than national 
law. 
 
The  activity  of  courts  is  not  a  simple function of formal  institutional  design.  Allowing 
private actors access does not by itself ensure that a court becomes active (see also 
Alter 2006) nor does granting a treaty body the authority to file infringement suits against 
governments  mean  that  they  will  actually  do  so  (see  Helfer  and  Alter  2009  for  the 
Andean Community). For private access to matter, two criteria need to be satisfied. First 
and most obvious, there must be legally binding regional rules that create rights and 
obligations for private parties. This allows private parties to sue and be sued on the basis 
of regional law. A second condition is that if private access is indirect, as it is for virtually 
all  cases  other  than  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights,  there  must  be  national 
institutions that  perceive  to  have  an  interest  in referring  cases to the regional  court. 
Some regional agreements require national courts to refer cases to a regional court if the 
issue  concerns  regional  law  but,  as  the  examples  below  will  illustrate,  this  does  not 
mean that this actually happens. In the case of the ECJ, it was crucially important that 
national courts started to see the ECJ as an ally that could help them advance their 
interests as opposed to an institution that encroached on their terrain (see Alter 1998, 
Weiler 1994). This is not (yet) the case for national courts in most OHADA member 
states (Dickerson 2005). In the case of the ATJ, the key national actors were national 
administrative agencies charged with protecting intellectual property rights (IP) that were 
the engines behind increased references to the regional court (Helfer and Alter 2009).  
 
The ATJ illustrates these points well. Until recent research by Larry Helfer, Karen Alter 
and  Florencia  Guerzovich,  little  was  known  about  the  world‘s  third  most  active 
international court (Helfer et al. 2009, Helfer and Alter 2009). The ATJ had only a minimal 
caseload in the 1980s and early 1990s. Yet, references to the court started to increase in 
1995  due  to  two  factors.  First,  the  Andean  Community  adopted  IP  rules  that  were 
broadly consistent with the TRIPS rules under WTO. These rules gave private actors 
rights and obligations under Andean law. At the same time, domestic administrative IP 
agencies  were  transformed  or  created.  These  agencies  were  in  charge  of  reviewing 
trademark  and  patent registrations.  Since the relevant  IP  law  was  regional  law,  they  
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applied  this  law  in  those  decisions.  Consequentially,  when  dissatisfied  businesses 
challenged these administrative decisions in courts, Andean law had to be interpreted by 
national courts. Initially most national courts were hesitant to refer such cases to the ATJ. 
Yet, through various forms of pressure by IP agencies, businesses, and lawyers, courts 
in three countries (Columbia, Ecuador, and Peru) started to refer IP cases to the ATJ.
30 
Such cases make up about 90% of the nearly 1500 judgments the ATJ has issued.  
 
Another interesting example of a regional regime that delegated authority in a limited 
issue area to a regional court is OHADA. OHADA (Organization for Harmonization in 
Africa of Business Laws) is a system of business laws and implementing institutions 
adopted  by  sixteen  mostly  francophone  West  and  Central  African  nations.
31 These 
countries adopted this regime in 1993 in order to stimulate (foreign) investments and 
promote  growth  (Mancuso  2006).  The  organization‘s  Council  of  Ministers  has  the 
authority to adopt uniform acts that need not be implemented by national legislatures. 
Many  of  the  acts  are  based  on  draft  conventions  and  model  laws  created  by  other 
organizations,  such  as  UNIDROIT,  but  they  are  adjusted  to  reflect  Western  Africa‘s 
realities. The Cour Commune de Justice et d‘Arbitrage  (CCJA) is an international court 
that ensures that OHADA laws are interpreted uniformly across the membership and to 
increase the credibility of the regional regime. Formally, the CCJA provides a forum for 
interstate arbitration as well as a court of last resort for disputes under OHADA law that 
were initiated within member states. Predictably, the first function remains undeveloped 
(Dickinson 2005). The second function has led to at least 274 judgments, most coming 
from Côte d‘Ivoire (the seat of the court), indicating that in reality national courts do not 
always refer OHADA cases to the CCJA.
32 Nevertheless, the regime is broadly perceived 
to be a remarkable success (Mancuso 2006). 
 
5.2  Broader Effects of Regional Judicial Institutions 
 
The  theory  section  stipulated  that  by  exercising  their  immediate  functions  of  dispute 
resolution and treaty interpretation, regional judicial institutions could also have broader 
effects on regional cooperation. Most notably, they can help improve compliance with 
regional agreements, increase the commitment that states have to regional integration, 
and provide checks and balances to new international authority.  
 
There is regrettably little evidence that regional judicial institutions have or have not had 
such  broad  effects.  While  there  is  considerable  evidence  that  national  courts  have 
mostly been willing to accept ECJ rulings in individual cases (e.g. Weiler 1994), it is 
unclear what broader effect the court has had on compliance in the EU.  It is clear that 
compliance  in  the  EU  is  far  from  perfect.  For  example,  Mastenbroek  (2003) 
                                            
30  See Helfer and Alter 2009 for the more precise story on the mechanisms in each country and also for a 
preliminary account of why the same trend has not happened in Bolivia and Venezuela. 
31  The Western African members are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d‘Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, 
Niger,  Senegal,  and  Togo.  The  Central  African  members  are  Central  African  Republic,  Chad, 
Cameroon, Comores, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. 
32  Alter 2009. Private parties may also not always insist on this, given the expense of proceedings in a 
another country (Dickerson 2005). There are hundreds more rulings on OHADA law that are decided in 
national courts.  
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demonstrates that even in the Netherlands, a country widely praised for its compliance 
with international law, only 40 percent of EU directives are implemented on time. More 
generally, research about compliance with EU law and the ECJ‘s role in this is fraught 
with data and methodological differences (e.g. Börzel 2001, Tallberg 2002). To make 
matters worse, Carrubba et al. (2008) find evidence that the ECJ may take anticipated 
compliance into account in its decision making process. To my knowledge, there are no 
systematic studies of compliance with the ECtHR or other regional courts. 
 
The  effect  on  commitment  can  only  be  gleaned  anecdotally.  While  there  are  many 
examples of failed regional integration projects (see Mattli 1999), I am not aware of a 
regional integration scheme that collapsed after it has had an active regional court. The 
possible exception is the Central American Court of Justice, which issued ten decisions 
between  1908  and  1916.  Cases  of  countries  withdrawing  from  the  jurisdiction  of  an 
active  regional  court  are  also  few  and  far  between.  The  withdrawal  of  Trinidad  and 
Tobago from the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights over the issue 
of the death penalty is the most prominent example that comes to mind (Helfer 2002). 
Yet, it is impossible to assert what the causal role of regional courts is in keeping a 
regional integration project going. 
 
There  is  anecdotal  evidence  that  regional  courts  have  had  commitment  benefits,  in 
unanticipated ways that may be attractive for Asian states. For example, Helfer et al. 
2009  document  how  the  distinct  Andean  interpretation  of  IP  law,  which  had  been 
influenced by national IP agencies, strengthened the Peruvian negotiation position in 
bilateral  bargaining  with  the  United  States  as  it  allowed  the  Peruvian  delegation  to 
credibly claim that they could not make certain concessions given that those would be in 
violation of Andean law. Given that Andean law cannot be changed by Peru unilaterally, 
this commitment device may work rather well. In this sense, then, opting for a regional 
legal regime may be a way of implementing legal obligations in a manner that stays 
closer to home than it would be in the absence of such a regime.  
 
The effect on checks and balances is clearer, albeit almost entirely build on qualitative 
evidence (e.g. Weiler 1994, Mattli and Slaughter 1998). A recent interesting exercise in 
checks and balances came in the ECJ‘s recent Kadi decision
33, which invalidated the 
EU‘s  implementation  of  a  Security  Council  resolution  that  requires  the  financial 
measures  against  persons  linked to  a  terrorist organization,  as  determined  by  a  UN 
Sanctions  Committee.    The  Kadi  decision  essentially  argues  that  persons  had  no 
effective legal remedy to challenge their placement on the list and thus the freezing of 
their  bank  accounts.  This  is  a  remarkable  example  in  checking  the  exercise  of 
international authority over individuals. 
 
More  generally,  it  has  proven  difficult  to  examine  empirically  to  what  extent  regional 
judicial institutions have indeed increased transnational economic activity. Kono (2008) 
finds that the presence of inter-state DSMs appears to stimulate regional trade but that 
there is no evidence that enhancing the legalistic features of this process have had any 
effect. Stone Sweet and Brunell (1998) find evidence that ECJ activity is both driven by 
                                            
33  Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P.  
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and drives transnational economic activity. There are no studies that I know of that show 
that OHADA has or has not increased (foreign) investment or whether the Andean IP 
regime has improved innovation. One piece of evidence cited by OHADA scholars is that 
additional  states  are  eager  to  join  the  organization  (Mancuso  2007).  The  same  is 
obviously true for the EU but less so for the Andean Pact. 
 
5.3  Institutional Implications for Asia 
 
What do these lessons mean for a potential judicial institution that could help stimulate 
transnational  economic  activity  in  Asia?  It  would  be  unwise  to  transplant  one  of  the 
existing  regional  judicial  institutions  to  Asia.  Outright  copying  of  formal  institutional 
structure is common but rarely successful (Alter 2009). Yet, there are some lessons that 
could be learned. The most obvious negative one is that an institution that focuses solely 
on resolving inter-state disputes is unlikely to contribute much. There are few downsides 
to having a formal inter-state dispute settlement mechanism, such as ASEAN‘s, but it is 
not clear that such a mechanism will have significant effects either. A second negative 
conclusion is that given the present institutional structure, it would be unwise to create a 
court that primarily aims to reduce deliberate non-compliance by member states. Such 
courts  can  only  function  effectively  in  the  presence  of  a  strong  supranational 
bureaucracy that can file infringement suits. 
 
The most straightforward answer to the question why there are no active standing Asian 
courts is that there are few if any regional rules that create rights and obligations for 
private parties. To some extent this is answering a question by positing a different one: 
why are such rules absent? I suggest two answers. First, heterogeneity within Asia is 
greater than in other regions. This is true even within the most developed sub-regional 
institution: ASEAN. This diversity makes it difficult to coordinate on regulations that are 
appropriate across a region or sub-region. Second, many Asian states have traditionally 
been characterized as ―developmental states,‖ which seek to exercise social and political 
control  over  business  through  informal  means  rather  than  through  independent 
regulatory  agencies  that  are  delegated  the  authority  to  apply  a  well-defined  body  of 
formal law (e.g. Woo-Cumings 1999).  Recently, scholars have argued that several Asian 
countries are moving towards a regulatory state model (e.g. Ginsburg and Chen 2008, 
Jayasurya 2007, Pearson 2005). This trend is at least partially a response to economic 
interdependence and membership in international regimes (Ginsburg and Chen 2008), 
as it was in Europe (Majone 1994). Such reforms create a demand for administrative 
review  as  both  governments  and  private  actors  become  increasingly  concerned  that 
agencies are unable to implement the new rules well or even that they might abuse their 
authority.   
 
Although regional law plays a limited role in Asian administrative review, a regional court 
could aid national courts and administrative agencies in areas where global international 
legal obligations are already important. Asian countries are party to various multilateral 
treaties that create obligations vis-à-vis private parties. Although there are no regional 
rules  on  government  procurement,  several  Asian  states  are  part  of  the  WTO's 
Government Procurement Agreement (Hsu 2006). The WTO‘s intellectual property rights 
regime (TRIPS) also has important implications for regulatory regimes. Moreover, many 
Asian  states  are  actively  seeking  to  bring  their  business  law  in  accordance  with  
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international standards. All major Asian economies are members of UNIDROIT
34 and 
many are signatories to its conventions that seek to unify private law. Several Asian 
states are members of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HccH) and 
are parties to its various conventions.
35 Asian states are also active in UNCITRAL, the 
UN body that seeks to harmonize and modernize international business law through 
conventions and model laws. 
 
There  is  some  evidence  that  Asian  countries  have  increased  such  commitments  in 
recent years. For example after long remaining outside the regime, South Korea (2005) 
and Japan (2009) are the latest major trading powers to join the 1980 UN Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG),
36 leaving Brazil, India, the United 
Kingdom, and South Africa as the only major trading countries that have not signed what 
is  arguably  the  most  successful  international  contract  treaty.  Another  example  was 
discussed earlier in this paper: the frequency with which Asian countries are willing to 
delegate authority to ICSID to arbitrate in investment disputes between private parties 
and the government. 
 
In  short,  several  Asian  states  appear  increasingly  willing  to  make  international  legal 
commitments  that  create  obligations  vis-à-vis  private  parties.  Moreover,  they  have 
recognized that harmonization of commercial law is desirable. Even if this has not led to 
new regional law, a regional judicial institution could improve the uniform implementation 
of those existing international legal commitments, improve the perceived commitments 
by  Asian  states  to  those  legal  rules,  and  create  further  momentum  towards 
harmonization. The suggestion is to create a judicial institution that can, at the request of 
national courts or administrative agencies, offer advisory opinions on the interpretation of 
international rules, laws, and standards that are already applicable. The assumption is 
that  governments  want  to  see  those  obligations  implemented  but  that  national 
administrative agencies or courts may not always be well-equipped to do so. While a 
complete proposal for a new judicial institution is beyond the scope of this working paper, 
I want to offer some thoughts and suggestions as to what such an institution could look 
like and could reasonably seek to accomplish. 
 
  The new institution would issue advisory opinions on a well-defined set of treaties 
and  conventions  that  countries  have  already  ratified.
37  It  would  leave  the 
resolution  of  disputes  to  the  national  courts.  This  is  appropriate  as  actual 
disputes often involve a mixture of domestic and international legal issues that 
can be better assessed by local courts. This may also alleviate some sovereignty 
concerns.  It  would  specifically  not  be  within  the  mandate  of this  institution  to 
interpret domestic law or make judgments as to whether domestic law contradicts 
                                            
34  http://www.unidroit.org/english/members/main.htm. 
35  http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=states.listing.  
36  They  were  the  only  major  countries  that  signed  in  this  period:  http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/ 
en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG_status.html. 
37  The determination of the set of treaties and conventions that are relevant here should be determined 
by legal experts. States should then be able to choose among that list.  
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international legal obligations. Such determinations are left to the national review 
process. 
  The judicial institution would be composed of experts of international commercial 
and business law. It could be hosted by the Asian Development Bank as part of 
its technical assistance mission. Indeed, the ADB already supports business law 
reform through this program.
38 A first step could be the creation of a  working 
group of legal experts to investigate the sensibility of and demand for such an 
institution  or  other  ways  the  ADB  could  help  promote  the  harmonization  of 
business law.  
  I suggest an optional protocol that if ratified would give any party to a dispute in 
that country the right to refer a question about the appropriate interpretation of 
international law to the new judicial institution. It might make sense to limit this to 
disputes  before  appellate  courts.  Ratifying  such  a  protocol  would  signal  a 
commitment  to  uniform  application  of  international  obligations.  I  propose  that 
governments that have not signed the optional protocol may still request advisory 
opinions in certain circumstances (perhaps on a pay-per-use basis). Such usage 
would  obviously  not  send  the  same  commitment  but  could  well  contribute  to 
uniform interpretation. 
  Since many of the laws that this institution would interpret are global in nature, it 
may  seem  odd  to  design  a  regional  institution  to  interpret  them.  First,  other 
regions already have judicial institutions that, among others, interpret the laws 
under discussion here. Given this, they would have little impetus in partaking. 
Second, international legal obligations are interpreted in a context. For example, 
CISG obligations have been interpreted differently in countries with different legal 
cultures and developmental status (Ryan 1996). Although Asia is a large and 
extremely diverse continent, the world is bigger and even more diverse. There is 
a demand for Asian cooperation that is at least partially driven by the perception 
that there are a set of common development challenges. Moreover, given high 
levels of intra-Asian trade, the benefits of uniform interpretation within Asia might 
encourage  more  Asian  states  to  sign  on  to  the  various  conventions  that  are 
already open for signature. Third, the institution may serve as a model or impetus 
for future innovation. It does not create new legal obligations but it could create a 
framework  for  future  Asian  conventions  towards  harmonizing  business  laws. 
Fourth, by not integrating the institution into one of the existing regional initiatives, 
it  provides  a  model  for  harmonization  that  recognizes  the  enormous  diversity 
among Asian states. Each state could sign on at its own pace and based on the 
conventions it has ratified. The model provides incentives towards harmonization 
but creates no obligations. 
  The  idea  is  not  to  create  another  institution  for  international  commercial 
arbitration. There are two important limits to arbitration. First, as  noted in the 
theory section, arbitral tribunals have limited capacity to clarify the meaning of 
                                            
38  See for example ―Technical Assistance Solomon Islands: Supporting Business Law Reform‖ Project 
Number: 38151: http://www.adb.org/Documents/TARs/SOL/38151-SOL-TAR.pdf.  
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legal obligations and thus do not contribute to their uniform interpretation. Indeed, 
it is plausible that the new institution could contribute to the uniform interpretation 
of the law by arbitral tribunals, which is a big issue in the arbitration literature (i.e. 
arbitral  tribunals  tend  to  be  inconsistent  in  their  interpretation  of  legal  rules, 
contributing to uncertainty).  For example, CISG is regularly interpreted in courts 
and  arbitral  tribunals
39  but  their  interpretations  have  diverged  considerably; 
limiting the treaty‘s intended unifying effects (Ryan 1996). Second, international 
commercial arbitration is usually accessible only to large foreign investors; often 
only investors from certain countries. This regime is therefore frequently criticized 
for creating different rights for different investors. While large foreign investors 
are important, economic development is driven as well by smaller investors and 
domestic actors.  
  The  judicial  institution  operates  on  the  assumption  that  governments  are 
interested in assuring that their international legal obligations are implemented 
and  interpreted  in  a  uniform  way  across  the  region.  Domestic  courts  and 
regulatory agencies are already regularly asked to interpret international rules, 
standards  and  regulations.  They  may  be  ill-equipped  to  do  so.  The  judicial 
institution seeks to rectify this problem. The institution is not based on the naive 
assumption that deliberate non-compliance is not a problem but does assume 
that  progress  can  be  made  by  improving  implementation  and  coordination  in 
areas where governments do want to comply.  
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
Effective regional judicial institutions perform two core tasks that can stimulate economic 
activity: they resolve disputes in efficient and impartial ways and they coordinate the 
interpretation of laws and treaties. In so doing, they could also have broader effects on 
regional  cooperation  such  as  improving  incentives  for  compliance,  increasing  the 
perceived commitment of parties to a regional integration project, and contributing to the 
implementation of agreements. The analyses in this paper demonstrate that Asian states 
have not foregone these theoretical advantages because they are inherently adverse to 
legalized dispute resolution. Moreover, their reluctance to resolve inter-state disputes 
through regional judicial institutions is shared by states in other regions. 
 
The examples of the Andean Community and OHADA illustrate that it is possible to use 
a  regional  court  to  help  harmonize  narrow  areas  of  law  relevant  for  transnational 
economic  activity  without  creating  a  powerful  supranational  bureaucracy.
40 Moreover, 
these examples demonstrate that national institutions still play a major role in the extent 
to which such a regional court becomes active in a country, perhaps alleviating some 
concerns about sovereignty costs and that Asian states are too diverse to effectively 
harmonize laws. These courts mostly review decisions by administrative agencies that 
                                            
39  For a database, see: http://www.unilex.info/.  
40  Some international bureaucracy is required but such a bureaucracy need not have the power to issue 
binding directives, as in the case of the European Commission.  
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affect private actors. National courts may lack the expertise to review such administrative 
decisions and/or the law may be regional in character, as is the case with intellectual 
property rights law, which operates in the shadow of the WTO regime. Unlike with the 
resolution of inter-state disputes, there is no particular reason why a regional court of this 
type  would  interfere  with  political  or  consensual  forms  of  dispute  resolution  between 
states. Yet, the theoretical benefits of harmonizing (and presumably improving the quality 
of) areas of corporate law could be substantial.  
 
Neither the ATJ nor the CCJA are exemplary in their functioning. Indeed, the conditions 
for an effective regional court of this type may well be better in Asia, although there are 
also some obstacles. For example, OHADA was greatly helped by the fact that virtually 
all of its member states had similar laws on the book that were inherited from the French. 
Asian countries are more diverse in this regard. As such, the most suitable candidates 
may be areas of law where international obligations already play a major role, such as 
intellectual property rights and investment law.  There may also be political advantages 
to developing a distinct Asian jurisprudence in such areas given that these issues are 
bound  to  emerge  in  future  rounds  of  WTO  negotiations  or  in  bilateral  trade  and 
investment treaty negotiations. The institutional innovation suggested in this paper seeks 
to improve the way existing legal obligations are implemented throughout Asia, thereby 
contributing to a greater uniformity and predictability in the laws under which businesses 
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Table 1: Trade Dispute Initiation  
 
Variable  Developing Countries  Developed Countries 
Asia  .38 (.39)  -.16 (.37) 
Previous Initiations  .09 (.03)***  -.01 (.00)** 
Democracy  .19 (.09)**  .50 (.22)** 
Log GDP  1.00 (.24)***  1.67 (.60)*** 
Log Population  -.48 (-.22)**  -.99 (.59)* 
English  -.31 (.32)  1.31 (.41)*** 
WTO Period  -.08 (.26)  .58 (.16)*** 
Constant  -18.80 (3.22)  -29.04 (6.55) 
Dispersion parameter  .74 (.17)  .32 (.08) 
N  1314  543 
 
         *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 (two-tailed).  
 
         Source: Davis and Bermeo 2009, Tables 2 and 3. 
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Table 2: Ordered Probit Results for Delegation to Delegate Dispute 
Settlement to ICSID  
 
Variable  Coefficient (Robust S.E.) 
Asian Home Country  .48 (.17)*** 
Asian Host Country  .18 (.10)* 
Both Asian Countries  -.18 ( .29) 
   
Presence of MNCs in Home   1.83 (.72)*** 
Strength of Legal Institutions in Home   .13 (.04)*** 
Strength of Legal Institutions in Host   .03 (.04) 
Durability of Host Regime  -.00 ( .00) 
Political Constraints on Executive in Host   .38 (.19)* 
Alliance Ties   -.05 (.08) 
Colonial Ties   -.12 (.12) 
Host Recently Independent   -.28 (.10) 
Domestic Economic Growth Host  -.00 ( .00) 
Export Dependence Host   .00 (.00)** 
Reliance on External Financial Assistance Host   .77 (.39)** 
Right Wing Government Host  .02 (.08) 
Ratio of Home to Host Economic Power  .66 (.16)*** 
 
N = 1032 Bilateral Investment Treaties, *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 (two-tailed).Wald χ2 test (16df) = 97.12 (.00)  
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Table 3: Multinomial Logit Results for the Outcomes of Rounds of Talks 
over Disputed Territory  
 
  Legal Dispute Settlement  
vs. Bilateral Concessions 
Legal Dispute Settlement  
vs. Stalemate 
Asian involvement  -.27 (1.06)  -.55 (1.05) 
Both countries Asian  .22 (1.24)  .40 (1.22) 
Strong domestic political opposition  1.36 (.48)***  .95 (.47)*** 
Democratic dyad (accountability)  1.35 (.60)***  1.29 (.58)*** 
Ethnic ties with territory  .92 (.41)***  .89 (.46)** 
Enduring rivals  1.54 (.70)***  1.20 (.67)* 
Hard-line stance in previous negotiations  .02 (.20)  -.47 (.19)*** 
Democratic dyad (norms)  -.70 (.65)  -.31 (61) 
Military asymmetry  -3.64 (1.48)***  -4.60 (1.46)*** 
Common security ties  .60 (.43)  .62 (.42) 
Strategic value of territory  -.64 (.58)  -.75 (.57) 
Constant  -3.02 (.51)***  -3.36 (.50)*** 
 
Note: N = 1490. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 (two-tailed). 
 
Source: Allee and Huth 2006, Table 2.          
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Appendix: Data Sources 
 
Table 1: Trade Dispute Initiation  
 
Variable  Description and Source 
Democracy  Freedom House civil liberties 
Log GDP  GDP in constant 2000 dollars,in purchasing power parity terms, World 
Bank‘s World Development Indicators 
 
Log Population  World Bank‘s World Development Indicators 
English  English language, which takes on the value of 1 if the CIA World 
Factbook listed English as ―widely spoken‖ in a given country 
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Table 2: Investment Dispute Delegation 
 
Variable  Description and Source 
Strength of Legal Institutions   International Country Risk Group measure of ―law and order,‖ 
ranging from 1 to 6 
Durability of Host Regime  the number of consecutive years since a three-point change in the Polity 
score over a period of 3 years of less (see Marshall and 
Jaggers 2005) 
Political Constraints on Executive  
in Host  
Henisz‘s POLCONIII measure of political constraints on the  executive in 
the host country (see Henisz 2002) 
Alliance Ties   equals 1 if the home and host country share any type of alliance tie and 
0 otherwise; taken from the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions  
project (Leeds et al. 2002) 
 
Colonial Ties   equals 1 if the home and host country share any type of colonial tie and 
0 otherwise; taken from the Issue Correlates of War colonial history data 
set, version 0.4 
 
Host Recently Independent   equals1 if the host country achieved independence within the past 10 
years and 0 otherwise; dates of independence are taken from the 
Correlates of War State System Membership List 
Domestic Economic Growth Host  GDP growth in host country from last year to the current year; taken 
from World Development Indicators 
Export Dependence Host   exports of goods and services as a % of GDP; taken from World 
Development Indicators 
Reliance on External Financial 
Assistance Host  
IBRD loans and IDA credits as a % of Host country GDP (in current 
US$); taken from World Development Indicators 
Right Wing Government Host  equals 1 if the host country is governed by a right-wing executive and 0 
otherwise; taken from the Database of Political Institutions‘ EXECRLC 
variable 
Ratio of Home to Host Economic 
Power 
the relative balance of home and host country GDP, calculated as home 
country GDP divided by the sum of home and host country GDP (all in 
current US$); data taken from World Development Indicators 
 
GDP = gross domestic product, IBRD = International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, IDA =  
international development assistance. 
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Table 3: Territorial Disputes 
 
Variable  Description and Source 
 
Strong domestic political opposition 
 
Equals 1 if in democratic countries are considered to face strong 
domestic political opposition governing coalition of executive does 
not control a majority of seats in the primary legislative or 
parliamentary body and if in nondemocratic countries there has been 
an attempted or actual coup within the country in the past year 
 
Democratic dyad (accountability)  Those regimes that have a Polity net-democracy score of +6 or 
higher. 
Ethnic ties with territory  Equals 1 if each state involved in the dispute has ethnic ties with a 
population living in the disputed territory 
Enduring rivals  Equals 1 if the two disputants have experienced at least ten 
militarized conflicts during the past two decades 
Hard-line stance in previous 
negotiations 
Number of consecutive rounds of talks in the last five years have 
ended in stalemate 
Democratic dyad (norms)  Equals 1 if both states possessed Polity net-democracy scores of +6 
or greater for at least 16 of the past 20 years 
 
Military asymmetry     Absolute difference in Correlates of War Composite Index of    
National Capability scores 
 
Common security ties    Equals 1 if a formal security alliance exists 
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